A secret sharing scheme allows to share a secret among several participants such that only certain groups of them can recover it.
Introduction
A secret sharing scheme [20, 21 allows to split a secret into different pieces, called shares, which are given t o the participants, such that only certain groups of them can recover the secret,. The first secret sharing schemes have been threshold schemes, wherc only groups of more than a ccrtain number of participants can recover the secret.
Verijiuble secret sharing (VSS)
;t cryptographic primitive proposed in [7] to achieve security against cheating participants. A verification protocol allows the honest participants to ensure that they can recover a unique secret. VSS plays an important role in the design of protocols for secure multi-party computation (see e.g. [l] ). The first realization of VSS, presented in [7] , has the very special property that not only the participants, but everybody is able to verify that the shares h a v e been correctly distributed. We will call such schemes publicly werzfiable secret sharing (PVSS) schemes. Apart from the applications for "ordinary" VSS, PVSS can be used for new escrow-cryptosystems, and for the realization of digital payment systems with revocable anonymity.
The main technical results of this paper are two new PVSS schemes which can also be used with general (monotone) access structures. Both schemes are based on ElGamal's cryptosyslerri [9] . Furthermore, the security of the first scheme can be proved to be equivalent to some well-known cryptographic problems.
Publicly Verifiable Secret Sharing and Applications

An Informal Model of PVSS
In the sequel we give a informal description of secret sharing, verifiable secret sharing, and publicly verifiable secrct sharing. It is not our goal to present a precise mathematical definition, but t o illustrate the basic properties of the schemes and t o point out the difference between ordinary and publicly verifiable secret sharing.
A secret sharing scheme consists of a. One problem of such secret sharing schemes is that they are not secure against cheating participants who send false shares when the secret is to be recovered. Another problem is that a cheating dealer could distribute false shares, so that different groups of participants recover different secrets. Such problems arise in protocols for secure multi-party computations (see e.g. [l]), and can be solved with verifiable secret, sharing (VSS) schemes [7] .
A VSS scheme is a secret sharing scheme with ari additional, possibly interactive algorithm Verify which allows the participants to verify the validity of Theoretically, PVSS could be realizcd using techniques of [4] to prove (or to argue about) the satisfiability of a circuit,, but this would be very inefficient.
Wc will present morc practical solutions for sharing discrctc logarithms and for sharing e-ih roots in Sections 3 and 4, respcctively. Bot,h schemes are based on ElGamal's cryptosysterri [9] .
Applications of PVSS
Apart from t,he applications of ordinary secret, sharing arid of VSS, there arc two interesting problems for which PVSS can be used. One of those is software key escrow, such as nlficali's fair cryptosyst,erris [16] . The basic: idea of fair cryptmystcms is tliat, any user shares his secret key among scveral trustworthy (from the user's point of' view) escrow agenls by means of a VSS scheme. Each escrow agent can verify that he obtained a correct share of the secret key. However, one problem of such fair cryptosystcms is that the recipient of an encryptcd message decides on the set, of trustworthy escrow agent, although the sender of the message might trusts a different set of agent,s. Furthermore, the set of escrow agents can only bc changed by changing the key. A better solution for this problem would be to have the sender provide information for the escrow agents to decrypt the messagc. Such a system could be realized using a non-interactive PVSS scheme with an a c~e s s structure that, allows the recipient a s well as a the escrow agents to recover (i.e. decrypt) the message. Since the encrypted shares can be publicly verified, everybody, e.g. any network provider, can verify thal the message could be recovered by a lcgitiinale subset of escrow agents.
Another application of PVSS is the tiesign of electronic cash systems providing revocable monyinity [5, 21, 15, 61 . Payrnerits made with such syst,ems arc (usually) not traceable to the payer, but if the anonymity of the scheme is abused for criminal activities, the payer's identity can be recovered with the help of so-called trustees or judges. PVSS could be used to verifiably encrypt tracing-information for the trustees in a transactiori without compromising the anonymity of that transxtion.
PVSS for Sharing Discrete Logarithms
We will first describe two well-known methods for verifiably sharing discrete logarithms. The verification for both schcmcs consists of checking whether the secret share is the discrete logaritlirri of a pihlicly known element. 'I'lierefore, these schemes can be extended to PVSS schemes by means of an encryption scheme that allows to verify that a cipher-text coritains t,he discrete logarithrri of a given value. Let iis first briefly dcscribc the number-theoretical setting.
3.1
Let) p be a large primc so that q = ( p -1 ) / 2 is also prime', arid let h E Z i be an element of order q . Let further G be a group of order p , and Ict ,9 bc a gcnm-ator of G so that computing discrete logarithms to the base y is difficult,.
Our scheme will niake use of double exponentiation. By double exponcntiation with bases g and h we mean the function Double Exponentiation arid Double Discrete Logarithms 72, + G : c t ) g('1') .
By the double discrete logarithm of y E G to the bases y and h we mean Ihe 
3.2
Let s E Z P be the secret value and let S = ys be publicly known. There are different ways to verifiably share this secret,. We first, prctscnt a solut,ion for general monotone access structures, arid then briefly describe a threshold scheme Let A be a rrioriotoiie access structure. For each A = {jl, . . . , j k } E A, the To make these schemes publicly verifiable, we need a public-kcy encryption schcme that allows to vvrifiably encrypt t,he discrete logarithm of a publicly known element. In other words, given a cipher-text IV and a group e,lemeiit s, it should he possihle to convince everybody that the recipient, obtains log, S by decrypt5ng 14'.
3.3
Our encryption scheme is ident,ical to ElGarnal's public key system [9] , which is a, variation of the Diffie-Hcllman key-exchange protocol [8] .
First, cach participant, randomly chooses a secret, key z t Z, and publishes his public-key y = h," (mod p ) , To encrypt, a message 7 n E Zz with the public:-key y, t,he dealer randomly chooses 0 E Zq and calculates the pair ( h " , , r r~~~ . yo) (mod p ) .
Verifiable Encryption of Discrete Logarithms Thc cipher-text ( A , B ) can be decrypted by the rccipient by calculating
TrL = A " / B (mod p ) .
Let us now desc:I-ibc: a protocol for verifying t,hat a pair ( A , B ) encrypts the discrete logarithm of a public element V = gu of the group G. It is based on the fact that if ( A , D ) is equal to (h",v-l ' y " ) (mod p ) for any LY E Z, then
The prover (who will be the dealer in the secret sharing scheme) now proves to the verifier that Ihe disciete logarithm of A to the base h is identical to the double discrete logarithm of V B to the bases g and y.
Prover Verifier repeat K times:
With t'he techniques of [la] for converting an ideritification scheme into a signature scheme, combined with ideas from [19] , we can construct a non- The non-interactive proof consists of R and c. A verifier computes t h 2 = hr~ACT (mod p ) and t,, = ( g ' -"~T f '~B ) (~' a ) for 7 = 1 . . f , and checks whether (*) holds.
Analysis
There are two points to consider when discussing the security of the scheme. First, even if we assume that computing discrete logarithms and breaking ElGamal's public-kcy system is hard, we have to check whether computing u from both V = g" and the cipher-t,ext (A, B), is also hard. Second, we have to makc sure that, t,he dealer ca.nnot cheat in the verification protocol arid that no "useful" information about u is given away. T i e can prove the following two propositions.
Proposition 1. Under the assumpt?on thut computing discrete logarithms i n G is ,iiifeas,ible, uud Lliul Ds.eakin!l the ElGamal cryptosystem is h r d , mmputing II from 9'' and ( h a , uU-'ya) is at least a.s h>ard as solving the D e c i s i o n -D z~e -H e l l m a n problem t o th,c base h in Z;.2
Sketch, of Proof: Note that it is possible t,o decide whether the encrypted logarithm IJ is a quadratic resiclue in Z; , because the base h (and the public key y) is a quadratic residue, but that it remains difficult to break ElGarnal's cryptosystern, i t . to completely recover the encrypted message.
Assume that there is ari efficient algorithm P that computes v on input (y", h", h", 71-'h"') with a non-negligible probability E over all u E Zi, and z , cy E Z i . We show how to iisc P to decide whether a given triple ( A , B , C) of elements in ( h ) , is a Diffie-Hellman triple, i.e. whether C = h ' o g~~A ' ' n g l , B (mod p ) .
First, we need a method to randomize (A, I?, C). Therefore, wc choose p E Zi, and cr, 7 E Z, at random and calculate (,q, B , c) = (APh", Bh', CPAP'B"h"').
Since y, the order of h in Z; , is prime, it can easily be shown that the triple ( A , B , C ) is a random Diffie-Hellman triple if (A, B , C) is a Diffie-Hellman triple, and a random non-Diffie-Hellman triple, ot,herwise. Now, we randomly choose '(I E Z i arid run P on input (gw,A,B,uplC). Thc probability that P returns IJ depends on whether ( A , B , C) is a Diffie-Hellrnan triple or not:
-If ( A , B , C) is a Diffie-Hellman triple then 'P returns IJ with probability E .
-If ( A , B, C) is not a Diffie-Hellman triple then the probability that P returns TI is negligible. Lct us assume on the contrary that P returns II with a nonnegligible probability y. Then the discrete logarithm of any Y E G can be computed by repeatedly running 'P on input (Yy/',h",h',t) with p ER Zp, cr, T E R Z q , arid t ER "6 until P returns p + log, Y (mod p ) . Because the probability that t / ( p + log, Y) ( show is an encryption scheme that allows to efficiently prove that a cipher-text contains the e-th root of a given element.
4.1
Let g E Z:?, be a public value of large order. Each participant raridoIrily chooses a secret key z E ZT2. and computes the corresponding public key y = g2 (mod n) . The recipient can easily obtain the e-th root, of M by calculating
With the following interactive protocol t>he sender can prove that the pair (A, B ) encrypts the e-th root of M = mc (mod n) ( e > 0).
Prover Verifier
repeat K times: ( A , B ) are included, the whole share has a length of only -(4 + c ) . log, TZ bits. For a "practical" scheme we recommend to choose 2750, e > 80 and E z i.
Analysis
As in Section 3.4, we have to consider the securit,y of the encryption scheme and the security of the verification protocol. Unfortunately, a statement similar to proposition 1 is difficult to prove. This is mainly because the order of g is riot prime and therefore a good randomization of non-Diffie-Hellman triples is not, possible anymore. If we required that the order of 9 is prime, then the security of the scheme could only be proved (in the manner of proposition 1) for messages 711. that belong to the subgroup generated by 9. For the security of the verification protocol, we can prove the following proposition: 
